The state of modern economics : Is rational man extinct? by Stephen Slivinski
picked up by major newspapers.  
Bloggers see their Web sites as complements to scholar-
ship rather than substitutes. “I can’t really see any negative
effects from that,” Schiff says. “And the obvious positive
effect is that it exposes people to things that otherwise
might only get published in academic journals.”
Still, it’s not clear that blogging can enhance a career.
Most, if not all, economics bloggers write from the lofty
position of tenure. But not all bloggers in every academic
discipline do. Rodrik probably wouldn’t blog if he were seek-
ing tenure at a top academic institution. “I guess I’m
sufficiently established that I don’t give a damn,” he says. 
The blogging wave may have crested but there’s always
room for another voice, however difficult to discern among
the cacophony. “For someone like me who is less well known
[than Krugman or Rodrik],” Schiff says, “it takes a much
longer time to build up a readership.”
As technology evolves, so will the blog, its authors, and
dynamic audience.  The whole enterprise may embody the
ideal of the influential economist Friedrich Hayek, who
believed in the power of decentralized, unplanned activity
— “spontaneous order.” While there’s no coordination 
per se, it’s kind of a market where rules emerge, Craig
Newmark says.
Perhaps it’s not surprising that some of the Austrian
thinker’s devotees have a blog called Café Hayek. RF
T
he audience that gathered in the ornate concert hall
for that night’s ceremony probably noticed the 
similarities of the two guests of honor standing next
to each other on stage. Both wore tuxedos accented by
white bowties and vests as was appropriate for the occa-
sion. Both wore glasses and were about the same height.
But the audience probably noticed a difference too. The
guest of honor standing on the right sported a  ponytail that
reached almost halfway down the back of his tuxedo jacket
— a rare sight at a ceremony  like this.
Delving into each man’s biography, the spectators might
have noticed more differences. The man on the left was born
in Tel Aviv and studied psychology as an undergraduate
because it struck him as more practical than philosophy. 
The ponytailed man was an economist born in Wichita,
Kan., who, before pursing the study of economics, started
out his academic life in electrical engineering because he
wanted to avoid the harder math classes required of physics
students. 
Yet there was an overriding similarity that evening, and it
was the reason for the tuxedos. Both men were about to be
awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics.
The date was Dec. 10, 2002. The man on the left was
Daniel Kahneman; the man on the right was Vernon Smith.
Both are regarded as academic pioneers for their use of lab-
oratory experiments as a way to test the basic premises of
modern economics. Yet the conclusions that each came to
over decades of their own research appear at odds with each
other. At issue is a fundamental question that cuts 
to the root of economic methodology: Do people act ration-
ally in a market setting and what does that mean for the
study of economics?
Or, to put it another way: Did Homo economicus ever walk
the earth and, if so, is he now extinct?
Homo economicus is a metaphorical species of human 
who is able to, as economists say, optimize. He exhibits
rationality in the economic sense by making decisions, even
in uncertain situations, based mainly on self-interest and a
strong grasp of the alternatives at hand. The mathematic
and analytical models that are the stock in trade of modern
economics rely on the prevalence of this form of human for
markets to reach equilibrium.
The group of researchers who call themselves “behavioral
economists,” like Kahneman, believe people don’t often act
that way in reality and have run multiple experiments to try
to prove it. On the other side of the debate are Smith and his
colleagues — the “experimental economists” — who have
been able to show that markets can reach equilibrium when
subjected to the right sort of tests in a laboratory. Yet, if 
people are indeed fundamentally irrational in the economic
sense, would they really be able to make the kinds of deci-
sions which help bring the market to equilibrium?
The debate about whether there ever was such a creature
as Homo economicus has recently broken into the mainstream
media discussion about how economists view the world. It’s
a discussion that has been at least 50 years in the making and
probably won’t end soon. 
Efficient Markets and Irrational Men
Vernon Smith notes that his brand of experimental econom-
ics began with a bout of insomnia. He was teaching at
Purdue in 1955, and in the middle of one particular night he
began to think about an experience he had at Harvard as a
graduate student.
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                 Economist Edward Chamberlin had run a series of exper-
iments with various groups of Harvard students when Smith
was pursuing his Ph.D. Chamberlin would tell some students
in this experiment that they were buyers and the rest sellers.
He would then give them a card with a number on it. For the
sellers, that value represented the minimum selling price for
the unit of good they needed to sell; for the buyers, it stood
for the maximum buying price. On paper, these values cor-
responded to places on a hypothetical supply or demand
curve. Then Chamberlin let the students circle the room and
negotiate whatever contract they wanted. Once a bargain
had been struck between a buyer and a seller, the transaction
was recorded on the classroom blackboard. 
What Chamberlin had in mind was an experimental test
of competitive equilibrium theory, which suggests a market
will converge on a single price where supply and demand
overlap. Instead, his experiments produced trades at sub-
stantially different prices, and the observed average price
was actually lower than equilibrium theory would predict.
The paper Chamberlin published on the experiments
went virtually unnoticed by the economics profession. But
Vernon Smith had taken part in one of these experiments
and thought there might be something more to them. 
“So, there I was, wide awake at 3 a.m., thinking about
Chamberlin’s silly experiment,” Smith recounted in a 1991
essay. “The thought occurred to me that the idea of doing an
experiment was right, but what was wrong was that if you
were going to show that competitive equilibrium was not
realizable… you should choose an institution of exchange
that might be more favorable to yielding competitive equi-
librium. Then when such an equilibrium failed to be
approached, you would have a powerful result.”
Smith’s experiment made two main changes to
Chamberlin’s design. The first was in structure: Smith decid-
ed to use a “double auction” mechanism in which buyers and
sellers called out their bids and the successful trades were
recorded by the moderator, an arrangement that more close-
ly mimicked a real-life commodity or stock exchange. 
He also tried the experiment with the same group of people
for multiple rounds to allow them to learn from their previ-
ous experience. 
A competitive equilibrium emerged from this more
structured market environment. Smith initially didn’t
believe the results so he tried it with another set of students.
And then another. Over the following several years, he found
himself producing experimental results that exhibited stun-
ning consistency and robustness. Competitive equilibrium
theory was being vindicated.
Meanwhile, a political scientist named Herbert Simon at
Carnegie Mellon University published a 1955 Quarterly
Journal of Economics article titled, “A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice.” With this essay, Simon opened up a line of
inquiry that for years to come would challenge the founda-
tion of classical economics. 
“Traditional economic theory postulates an ‘economic
man,’ who, in the course of being ‘economic’ is also ‘ration-
al,’” wrote Simon. “Rather, I shall assume that the concept
of ‘economic man’ … is in need of fairly drastic revision.” 
The means by which Simon did this was to bring into the
analysis some insights from psychology. He posited that
humans have natural limits on their cognitive ability. So
instead of supposing a rational man who can instantly reason
to the optimal solution to a problem, Simon thought econo-
mists should define the agents within their models as
exhibiting “bounded rationality.” This uniquely human form
of rationality is one in which a person arrives at a solution
that may not be perfect in a computational sense but is sim-
ply good enough to satisfy them. “Because of the
psychological limits of the organism … actual human ration-
ality-striving can at best be an extremely crude and
simplified approximation to the kind of global rationality”
that is often implied in economics models, Simon wrote. 
Simon received a Nobel Prize in Economics for this
approach in 1978, making him the first noneconomist to win
that prize. But the research program that eventually became
known as behavioral economics didn’t really come into its
own until psychologist Daniel Kahneman and his co-author
Amos Tversky (a cognitive psychologist based at Stanford
University before his death in 1996), began to make their
mark on the economics profession.
One of the first high-profile articles their collaboration
produced appeared in the journal Econometrica in 1979  —  a
contribution that would turn out to be the most-cited 
article in that journal’s history. In it, the authors proposed a
new way to look at how people make decisions. They too
suggested that people do not weigh risky choices the way a
computer (or Homo economicus) would. 
They tested this insight with a series of experiments in
which participants were asked if they would accept certain
gambles. The result was that people’s answers tended to
diverge from what they would be if the respondents were
optimally assessing the true risks of each gamble. That’s
because, Kahneman and Tversky posited, people don’t 
think in terms of traditional probability theory. People
instead think in terms of the prospects for losing what they
already have. 
“If you think in terms of major losses, because losses
loom much larger than gains — that’s a very well-established
finding — you tend to be very risk-averse,” Kahneman told
Forbes in 2002. 
“I’ll give you an example: Suppose someone offered you a
gamble on the toss of a coin. If you guess right, you win
$15,000; if you guess wrong, you lose $10,000. Practically no
one wants it. Then I ask people to think of their wealth, and
now think of two states of the world. In one you own [your
current assets] minus $10,000 and in the other you own
[your current assets] plus $15,000. Which state of the world
do you like better? Everybody likes the second one. So when
you think in terms of wealth — the final state — you tend to
be much closer to risk-neutral than when you think of gains
and losses.”
Kahneman’s conclusions spawned a host of articles that
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            sought to displace the old assumptions about rationality in
economics. The collection of observations were grouped
loosely under the umbrella of what came to be known as
“prospect theory.” 
After the publication of the Econometrica article,
Kahneman began collaborating with economist Richard
Thaler, currently of the University of Chicago, on a few
experiments that were meant to flesh out the boundaries of
prospect theory. What they and their colleagues discovered
would stand for about 20 years as one of the more enduring
insights of behavioral economics. New research, however,
has begun to call into question the robustness of some of
these results.
The Endowment Effect
Imagine that you decide to participate in one of these
behavioral economics experiments. When you show up at
the lab, you are given either a ballpoint pen or a coffee mug.
Which one you get is decided by purely random chance.
Then you’re asked if you’d like to trade what you’ve been
“endowed” — that’s economist-speak for what you’ve been
given. In this case, say it’s the mug. If you decide to give up
the mug, you’ll get the pen which, you are told, is of equal
value.  
Behavioralists predict, based on the many versions of this
experiment they’ve conducted, that you probably won’t
trade the mug for the pen. But it’s not because the mug is
inherently nicer than the pen. In fact, when the option to
take home the mug is given to those who have the pen, most
of them decide not to trade either. 
According to standard economic theory, that shouldn’t
happen. Since the goods were randomly distributed, there
should be much more trading in these experiments than
actually occurs.
Behavioral economists call this the “endowment effect.”
It predicts that the subjects in the experiment would have an
inherent aversion to losing what they already have. Parting
with the endowed good is perceived by the mug holders as a
loss greater than the potential gain from acquiring another
good of equal value. If true, this could tarnish some of the
classic notions about the efficiency of markets and the abil-
ity of people to trade rationally within them. A world in
which some trades don’t occur simply because too many
people are scared of parting with their goods would be one
with many suboptimal economic outcomes. 
Economists Charles Plott of Caltech — a pioneer in
experimental economics — and Kathryn Zeiler of the
Georgetown University Law Center, were able to 
duplicate the results of these experiments (particularly 
one by Kahneman and Thaler, but also one by their 
occasional co-author, Jack Knetsch, currently of Simon
Fraser University). But when they did so, they began to
notice some interesting things.
For instance, in the original experiments, subjects were
told to raise their hand when they wanted to trade their
good for the other good. When Plott and Zeiler ran the
same experiment, they noticed that subjects were looking to
others for cues. “When we asked them after the experiment
how they made their decision, many of them said they
looked around the room to see what other people were
doing,” says Zeiler. So, Plott and Zeiler decided to rerun the
experiment and introduce a secret ballot in which players
mark their decision to trade or not on a note card.
They didn’t take for granted any other element of the
original experiments either. They even played around with
the procedures by which the good was handed to the exper-
iment’s participants. In the original experiment, the subjects
were told, “I’m giving you the mug. It is a gift. You own it. 
It is yours.” But Plott and Zeiler speculated that might 
have signaled a certain high level of value for the mug.
Besides, the subjects might not know if the pen they might
get as a result of the trade is really any good. So, Plott 
and Zeiler simply told the participants: “The mug is yours.
You own it.” 
They also adjusted for other possible factors that might
have skewed the original results. The participants got to
inspect the other good before they made their choice. 
None of these were options given to the participants in 
early endowment effect experiments of Kahneman and
Knetsch.
“Once you control for these other things that might be
causing the gaps — even if you leave in place all conditions
necessary to trigger prospect theory — you don’t see gaps
anymore,” says Zeiler. “If endowment effect theory was 
correct, we should still see those exchange asymmetries.”
It’s a good example of how rules and institutions can
change an experiment’s outcome. In fact, that’s a crucial 
element in the debate between behavioralists and experi-
mentalists. The experimentalist camp’s main critique is that
modern behavioralists are interested mostly in uncovering
deviations from the textbook versions of rationality, not in
discovering whether there is something unique about mar-
kets that help people reach socially beneficial outcomes. 
For instance, some behavioral experiments don’t give the
subjects an opportunity to learn from their mistakes in the
context of a market mechanism or a trading situation that is
repeated more than once. Yet markets in the real world pro-
vide no shortage of educational experiences and repeat
encounters.
Rediscovering Homo Economicus
“In principle, as I see it, experimental market economics and
behavioral economics are complementary,” writes Vernon
Smith in his most recent book. The man who sought to
make economics a more experimental enterprise in the first
place instead suggests that the goal of experiments should be
to more closely approximate real-world markets.
In many of Smith’s own experiments, the markets in the
laboratory reach a competitive equilibrium even though the
traders don’t consciously realize how optimal their behavior
really was. As he wrote in 1991, “subjects are not aware 
that they are achieving maximum profits collectively and
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individually, in equilibrium, and, in fact, deny this when
asked.” 
Humans do seem to optimize, in the aggregate, over a
long time period. Experimental research provides solid evi-
dence that a structured market environment is important to
this process. In the real world, laws and trading procedures
are essential for markets to function well. And experiments
can give us critical insight about how best to structure 
those rules.
Progress needs market participants who can learn from
experience too. “People can make a lot of cognitive ‘errors’
on the way to creating a new market,” writes the once-
ponytailed Smith. (Eyewitness accounts confirm he opted
for shorter hair sometime in 2007.) “What are important
about individual choices are the decisions that cause people
across time and generations to change tasks, locations, and
directions in an effort to better themselves in response to
market prices.” 
In other words, there is still a little Homo economicus in all
of us. We just have to know how to lure him out of hiding.R RF F
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Look for the online Economic Briefs series highlighting 
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